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Abstract: It is now widely accepted that the emergence of voluntary corporate responsibility for 
human rights in the mid-1990s was a means of continuing ‘business-as-usual’ and avoiding both 
litigation and the binding regulation advocated by many campaigners. Voluntary corporate 
responsibility has been widely denounced as ‘whitewash’, a ‘mask’ or a ‘myth’, which has little effect in 
practice. In this article, I claim that voluntary corporate responsibility is far worse than ‘whitewash’: it 
actively bolsters the impunity enjoyed by corporations complicit in human rights abuse. The core 
contribution of this article is show how voluntary corporate responsibility for human rights renders the 
violence of development illegible, normalises plunder and equates resistance with irrationality or 
subversion.  I do this by returning to the birthplace of corporate responsibility for human rights: BP’s 
Colombian oilfields.  By combining extensive ethnographic research with peasant and human rights 
organisations with a trenchant critique of the colonial myths informing mainstream discussion of 
development, violence, business and human rights, I show that voluntary corporate responsibility 
thrives upon the state of exception that provides the permissive context of human rights violations.  
This has important implications for those seeking to address corporate complicity in human rights 
abuse.  The United Nations has responded to the potential of voluntary measures to detract from 
abuses by emphasizing the importance of judicial remedy alongside voluntary measures.  What the 
discussion here reveals is the extent to which voluntary measures and provision for judicial remedy 
may work in opposite directions. 
 
 
 
 
Sir Geoffrey Chandler, a retired Director of Shell International and founder of 
Amnesty International UK’s Human Rights and Business Group, had little success 
when he first began to invite companies to discuss human rights at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Human rights ‘were for governments, not for companies’ came the 
unanimous response.1 Just a few years later, corporate attitudes had undergone a 
remarkable about-face. By the turn of the twenty-first century, transnational 
corporations in every sector were signing up to human rights codes of conduct and 
parroting what was now common sense: recognizing and respecting human rights was 
not only morally correct, it was also good business sense. In 1996, after a media 																																																								
1 Geoffrey Chandler, ‘Business and Human Rights: Reflections on Progress Made and Challenges 
Ahead’. Talk at Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 4 December 2007, p. 2. Available at: 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/doc-business-human-rights-reflections-on-progress-made-and-
challenges-ahead  
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scandal over its complicity in the prosecution and execution of leaders of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in the Niger Delta, Shell became the 
first corporation to accept Chandler’s invitation. In early 1997, BP followed suit, 
establishing a process of dialogue with British international development NGOs after 
a similar outcry over a campaign of threats and selective killings against peasant 
leaders, environmental activists and trade unionists in Colombia. ‘Reputational 
disaster provided the stimulus,’ as Chandler put it. ‘Shell’s experience in Nigeria and, 
later, BP’s in Colombia provided us with a platform and a breakthrough’.2  
 
It is now widely accepted that the emergence of voluntary corporate responsibility in 
the 1990’s was a means of continuing ‘business as usual’ and avoiding both litigation 
and the legal regulation advocated by many campaigners.3 Corporate responsibility 
has been widely denounced as ‘whitewash’, a ‘mask’ or a ‘myth’, which has little effect 
in practice.4  Campaigners, and more recently the United Nations, have responded 
by emphasising the importance of judicial remedy for violations, in addition to 
voluntary mechanisms to encourage corporations to respect and protect human 
rights.5  More recently, moves have been made toward a binding human rights 
mechanism for transnational corporations.6  Corporations, so the argument goes, 
should pay due diligence to human rights of their own accord. They must, however, 
be held to account and make remedy to victims when they fail to do so. 
 
In this article, I claim that voluntary corporate responsibility is far worse than 
‘whitewash’: it actively bolsters the impunity enjoyed by corporations complicit in 
human rights abuses. To denounce corporate ‘whitewash’ is only to scratch the 
surface of appearances. It is to call attention to the ugly reality covered, but ultimately 
unaltered, by a veneer of rights talk. What this misses is the economic, legal and 
ethical framework within which corporations have come to recognise human rights – 
a framework that is fortified by voluntary corporate responsibility. The core 
contribution of this article is show how the discourse of corporate responsibility for 
human rights renders the violence of development illegible, normalises plunder and 
equates resistance with irrationality or subversion. Rather than mitigating against 
human rights abuse, it serves to justify the repression of Others who oppose 
‘development’ and ‘progress’. 
 
In order to make this case against voluntary corporate responsibility, it is necessary to 
say something about human rights.  A number of scholars have argued that the 
discourse of human rights is colonial by nature. ‘[R]ights’, cautions Walter Mignolo, 																																																								
2 Ibid., p. 2. 
3 See Ronen Shamir, ‘The De-Radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility’, Critical Sociology 
30:v3 (2004), p. 676; ‘Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claim Act’, pp. 92-117. 
4 John Madeley, Big Business, Poor Peoples: The Impact of Transnational Corporations (London and New 
York: Zed Books, 1999); Christian Aid, Behind the mask: the real face of corporate social responsibility (London: 
Christian Aid, 2004); Deborah Doane, ‘The Myth of CSR’, Stanford Social Innovation Review (Fall 2005), 
pp. 23-29;  Jedrzej Frynas, ‘The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies’, in International Affairs 81:3 (2005), pp. 581-598;  
5 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, pp.28-35. 
6 For a discussion, see Stéfanie Khoury and David Whyte, ‘New Mechanisms of Accountability for 
Corporate Violations of Human Rights’ (University of Liverpool, 2015).  Available at: 
https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/sociology-social-policy-and-
criminology/research/New%2CMechanisms%2Cfor%2CAccountability.pdf.  
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‘is a concept responding to imperial necessity’.7 Human rights rely upon a specific 
concept of the human that was an invention of modern colonialism: ‘the ideal of 
being Christian, the ideal man and – by the end of the Eighteenth century – the idea 
of citizen and of democracy’.8  From the time of the Conquest, international law – 
including ideas of ‘natural right’ and ‘just war’ - was elaborated to justify the forced 
subjugation of indigenous peoples who did not accept the Catholic Church or enter 
into commerce on the terms of the conquistadores.9 Yet histories of rights are also 
histories of struggle.  ‘The foundational stages of human rights theory and history’, as 
José-Manuel Barreto reminds us, ‘are to be found not only in the Enlightenment, but 
even before that, in resistance to the display of the capacity for destruction of 
imperialism – the dark side or the other constitutive pillar of modernity’.10 
 
In my own writing, I have approached human rights as concepts in struggle.11 My 
work on this topic comes out of longstanding engagement with movements that use 
human rights in decolonial and anti-capitalist resistance.12 From that perspective, I 
have emphasised that the politics of human rights depends upon what sort of ‘human’ 
is recognised as the subject of rights and upon what forms of violence are made visible 
and contested by demands for rights.13  Appeals to rights have a double valence. They 
can be linked to subversive strategies of resistance, or yoked to existing structures of 
power. With this in mind, what needs to be examined is how human rights became 
incorporated into voluntary corporate responsibility. Who were the ‘humans’ 
recognised as subjects of human rights?  How were human rights configured in terms 
of a particular set of problems, amenable to solutions that could be promoted by 
corporations?  Crucially, how did this differ from the problems identified by social 
movements appealing to rights at companies’ sites of operation?  
 
The standard account of corporate recognition of human rights as a response to 
protest is the product of a deeply colonial way of seeing. Transnational campaigns are 
presented as transmission belts for the struggles of dispossessed constituencies at 
companies’ sites of operation. Everything of significance (the protests, the media 
scandals) happens ‘here’ (Europe and the US), on behalf of Others elsewhere. Human 
rights are approached as something abstract that a corporation can simply respect 
and protect. While some ‘here’ disregard human rights or are co-opted into corporate 
agendas, cosmopolitan activists demand that corporations recognize the rights of 
those Others. Struggles at companies’ sites of operation are bracketed out.  As a 
result, we miss the profound discontinuity between those struggles, on the one hand, 																																																								
7 Walter Mignolo, ‘Who speaks for the “human” in human rights?’, in José-Manuel Barreto (ed..), 
Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law (Newcastle-
Upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2012), p. 49. 
8 Ibid., p. 48. 
9 See, for example, Anthony Angie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 13-31. 
10 José-Manuel Barreto, ‘Introduction: Decolonial Strategies and Dialogue in the Human Rights Field’, 
in José-Manuel Barreto (ed.), Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and 
International Law (Newcastle-Upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2012), p.21 
11See, in particular, Lara Montesinos Coleman, ‘Struggles, over rights: humanism, ethical 
dispossession and resistance’, in Third World Quarterly 36:6, pp. 1060-1075. 
12 For a detailed reflection on the ethnographic engagement with resistance movements that informs 
this article, see Lara Montesinos Coleman, ‘Ethnography, Commitment and Critique: Departing from 
Activist Scholarship’, in International Political Sociology 9:2 (2015), pp.263-280. 
13 E.g. Coleman, ‘Struggles, over rights’, pp. 1070-2. 
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and, on the other, the demands of transnational activists that corporations recognise 
‘human rights’. 
 
For activists at companies’ sites of operation, the demand is rarely that corporations 
simply respect human rights.  Rather, it is the economic model itself that is called into 
question. 14 Across much of the post-colonial world, the dominant mode of integration 
into global markets has been what is sometimes referred to as the ‘extractive-export 
model’ - or extractivismo (extractivism) in Latin American critical thought. Extractivism 
encompasses not only oil extraction and large-scale mining, but the full gamut of 
industries that appropriate nature for the accumulation of capital (such as big dams 
generating hydroelectricity for other parts of the world, or agribusiness producing 
cash crops for export).15  In continuity with the export enclaves of the colonial era, the 
bulk of the profits of extractivism go to foreign investors. Local people are a source of 
hyper-exploitable labour or surplus populations to be displaced.  Allegations of both 
corporate and state complicity in forced displacement and murder have become part 
and parcel of the extractive-export model. Across the Global South, activists 
contesting extractivism now constitute the majority of victims of selective assassination 
and forced ‘disappearance’.16  It is significant then that corporate responsibility for 
human rights was pioneered within the extractive sector. 
 
The analysis here seeks to rectify the colonialism of standard accounts of corporate 
recognition of human rights by tracing the trajectory of peasant resistance against 
BP’s Colombian oilfields in the late 1990s. This struggle was highly significant for the 
development of voluntary corporate responsibility. It was as a result of the negative 
publicity generated by the repression of these protests that BP became a leading 
proponent of the idea that companies should concern themselves with human rights.  
As I set out in the next section, BP’s presence in Colombia from the mid-1990s was 
accompanied by ecological devastation, the socio-economic dispossession and 
marginalisation of the local population, and systematic killings and forced 
‘disappearances’. Peasant activists used a discourse of rights to contest the entirety of 
this scenario, increasingly pitching the idea of rights against the violence of 
‘development’ itself.  
 
If we are to fully appreciate what was at stake in this resistance, it is vital to bust a 
myth that underpins mainstream discussion of business and human rights. As I make 
clear in the subsequent section of this article, the permissive context of widespread 
human rights abuse is not ‘lawlessness’, state ‘weakness’ or an absence of ethics (as the 
prevailing myth would have it), but the normalisation of states of exception. States of 
exception imply the active operation of state power to suspend normal rule of law and 
its attendant rights and protections in the name of ‘necessity’ or ‘emergency’. The 
normalisation of exception in the Global South has its origins in colonial rule and is 
inseparable from longstanding racialised narratives according to which some lives 																																																								
14 Ibid, pp. 1070-2; Gustavo Rojas-Páez, ‘Understanding Environmental Harm and Justice Claims in 
the Global South: Crimes of the Powerful and People’s Resistance’, in David Rodríguez Goyes, 
Hanneke Mol, Avi Brisman and Nigel South. eds. Environmental Crime in Latin America: The Theft of Nature 
and the Poisoning of the Land.  London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
15 For a discussion, see Juan Grigera and Laura Álvarez, ‘Extractivismo y acumulación por 
desposesión: un análisis de las explicaciones sobre agronegocios, megaminería y territorio en la 
Argentina de la posconvertibilidad’, in Theomai, 27-28 (2013), pp. 80-97. 
16 See, for example, César Rodríguez Gavarito (ed.), Extractivismo vs. derechos humanos: crónicas de los nuevos 
campos minados en el Sur Global. (Siglo Vientiuno Editores, 2016) 
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matter more than others. Importantly, it is those conceived as obstacles to capitalist 
imperatives of development and growth who are prone to being targeted by 
exceptional measures.   
 
The state of exception is also a useful concept for making sense of the legal 
underpinnings of contemporary extractivism. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, 
neoliberal globalisation has been accompanied by a radical shift in dominant 
understandings of the rule of law away from Enlightenment ideas of the citizen and of 
democracy. As transnational corporations become de facto legislators and international 
financial institutions condition aid upon domestic legal reform, a global constitutional 
structure has emerged in which law is less about protecting the rights of citizens (as 
per Enlightenment theories of a social contract), and more about protecting property 
rights and private contracts. The neoliberal vision of law effectively precludes the 
democratic right to pursue alternative forms of economy and society, as a result of 
both authoritarian repression and processes of law-making that by-pass even 
minimally democratic legislatures.17 As such, the rule of law itself occupies a 
paradoxical threshold between legality and exception, since it authorises deadly 
economic policies that are – from the perspective of formally recognised rights – 
illegal. 
 
With this in mind, I move on to consider BP’s response to negative publicity over its 
activities in Colombia. Leaked email correspondence confirms suspicions that the 
agenda behind BP’s engagement with British NGOs was to deflect attention from 
future allegations.  It would be of little surprise to activists that, while BP championed 
human rights, people around the oilfields were receiving threats telling them not to 
‘fuck with BP’.  However, to simply dismiss corporate responsibility as the co-optation 
of NGOs into corporate ‘whitewash’ would be to overlook the active role of NGOs in 
crafting a discourse of business and human rights that serves to entrench the violence 
of development.  In this discourse, corporations are approached as potentially ethical 
actors – albeit bumbling actors prone to making ‘mistakes’. Violence is located 
elsewhere, with ‘uncivilised’ local populations who fail to attain the standards of 
liberal moral citizenship. It is within these parameters that corporations are presumed 
to be capable of making up for the ‘’ of rule of law and of a sufficiently civilised society 
by voluntarily paying heed to human rights norms. 
 
In the final section, I make the case that this colonial narrative does not simply 
represent a failure at the level of analysis. It does not merely overlook the neo-
colonial/neo-liberal state of exception that enables perpetrators to kill with impunity.  
On the contrary, voluntary corporate responsibility for human rights bolsters that 
state of exception. The existing economic model – and all its legal underpinnings - is 
the taken for granted backdrop against which rights are supposed to be recognised.  
Rights are mere add-ons, to be defined by corporations.  What is at stake is a 
privatisation of human rights, entirely consistent with the neoliberal obliteration of 
citizenship rights and the redefinition of law outside of democratic contestation. This 
is, moreover, inseparable from the colonial imaginary that treats corporations as well-
meaning ethical actors and local populations as the source of violence. Those who 
appeal to the rights of citizenship in order to contest the extractivist model are 
politically non-existent. Contrary to the misconceptions of those who seek to 																																																								
17 Lara Montesinos Coleman, ‘Global Social Fascism: Violence, Law and 21st Century Plunder’, 
Centre for Global Political Economy working paper no. 15 (May 2018). 
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complement voluntary corporate responsibility for human rights with legally-binding 
measures, voluntary corporate responsibility serves to entrench the exclusion of 
colonised populations from the protection of law.  
 
 
Development / Violence 
 
In the two decades after BP began oil exploration in the Eastern foothills of the 
Colombian Andes, approximately 2,500 people were ‘disappeared’.18  Oil extraction 
at the hands of a consortium led by BP was accompanied, in 1992, by the installation 
of the 16th Brigade of the army in the administrative department of Casanare, tasked 
with providing security to the oil companies. Within weeks of the Brigade’s arrival, 
right-wing paramilitaries linked to drug-traffickers and landowning oligarchs began to 
be seen entering army bases, generating fears that here, as elsewhere in Colombia, 
paramilitaries were being integrated into state strategies of population control.19 
According to human rights defenders who documented the abuses, one per cent of 
the population around the oilfields had been killed by the time that BP withdrew from 
the region in 2011.20 
 
These figures are dramatic, yet they only begin to capture the devastation.  As one 
community leader put it, after a decade and a half of living alongside the oilfields, ‘we 
are not just victims of human rights abuses, we are victims of development itself’.21  
Selective killings and pre-emptive ‘disappearances’ of those likely to contest the 
economic model are just the visible surface of the violence that Arturo Escobar 
describes as ‘constitutive of development’.22 This is a violence that has worked its 
effects in Casanare through the slow strangling of a way of life.  It has left its trace in 
dried-up rivers, eroded farmland and roads, and the severance of the peasant 
population from their relationship with the land in pursuit of precarious employment 
opportunities in a region where social investment remains sparse.23  
 																																																								
18According to human rights organizations, 1,500 people were reported as ‘disappeared’ in the 
administrative department of Casanare during the period 1986-2007.  However, researchers have 
calculated that an another 1.029 ‘disappearances’ were not reported in this period, giving a total of 
2.553 disappeared during that period. See Javier Giraldo Moreno and Fabian Laverde (eds.), Casanare: 
Exhumando el Genocidio (Bogotá: Cinep and Cospacc, 2009), p.13.  
19 Procuraduría General de la Nación Procuraduría General de la Nación, Fiscalía General de la 
Nación, Defensoría del Pueblo, Consejaría Presidencial para los Derechos Humanos, Asociación 
Nacional de Usarios Campesinos and Fundación Comite de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos, 
Informe de la Comisión Interinstitucional Sobre la Situación de Derchos Humanos en los Departamentos de Casanare y 
Arauca (Bogotá,1995), photocopy, p.16. 
20 See Giraldo and Laverde (eds.), Casanare: Exhumando el Genocidio. 
21 Comments in a meeting with human rights defenders, Casanare, April 2007.  These comments were 
made in response to the suggestion from human rights defenders that the population should ‘demand 
development’ from the state. 
22 See Arturo Escobar, ‘Development, Violence and the New Imperial Order’, Development 47:1 (2004), 
p. 16. 
23 The 1986 report of the Administrative Department of National Statistics contains little information 
on Casanare, other than that the Department had 1 hospital, 10 health centres without beds,12 health 
posts with just 147 beds available in the entire department, 263 primary schools with 560 teachers 
attended by 14,572 children and 24 secondary schools with 3,458 pupils.  Jenny Pearce, ‘The Case of 
Casanare, Colombia’, unpublished research report for the Inter-Agency Group, 1998.  A decade and a 
half later, there had been little change to this scenario. See AUTHOR ET AL, 2007. 
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Reflections on the violence of development are often retrospective analyses, made 
after the experience is found impossible to assimilate to the fantasy, after the myth 
becomes impossible to sustain.24 The struggles of many social movements are 
expressed – at least initially - as struggles for ‘development’ (albeit for a different 
development): for better access to healthcare, decent jobs and so on. In the early days, 
many people in Casanare had given BP a cautious welcome. Social organizations - in 
particular activists linked to the national peasant association, ANUC,25 - had focused 
their efforts upon ensuring that the local population saw the benefits of the oil 
bonanza.26  More than a decade later, I accompanied a representative of an NGO set 
up by peasant leaders displaced from Casanare in the 1990s during community 
human rights meetings.  When he suggested to those who remained that they should 
‘demand development’, he was met with strongly voiced critique from people who 
had long since distanced themselves from the use of that concept for framing struggle. 
Nevertheless, at the inception of these struggles against BP, development was re-
appropriated in contestation of the economic model. Peasant organisations demanded 
development, but not as something abstract, to be defined in practice by global and 
national elites.  They invoked development to contest what rural organizations across 
Colombia often describe as being ‘abandoned by the state’ 
 
‘Development’ in these terms was closely articulated with a discourse of rights. It 
meant popular sovereignty over natural resources, as well as access to rights 
guaranteed on paper to all citizens. The new National Constitution of 1991 had 
recognized a plethora of rights, including rights to social security, stable employment, 
health, environmental protection, sustainable exploitation of natural resources and 
the repair of associated damage.27 Peasant demands for development and rights in 
Casanare were contradictory in this regard. These demands may have reinforced the 
authority of an often-murderous state, but they had little in common with the ‘rights-
based’ approaches that were coming to populate the international development scene 
at that time. ‘Rights-based development’ reiterates the colonial assumptions of 
mainstream development discourse, framing poverty as the effect of exclusion and 
powerlessness.  It draws a line between the expectations appropriate to ‘developed’ 
and ‘underdeveloped’ peoples, emphasising civil and political rights (participation, 
freedom of expression and so on) alongside ‘basic rights’ such as access to food.28  By 
demanding recognition of all the rights of citizenship, the peasant organizations set 
themselves in opposition to emergent ideas of ‘rights-based development’ and its 
underlying colonial logic. They were not just asking for a little more participation, or 
better satisfaction of basic needs within the terms of the existing economic model.  
Instead, the demand for citizenship rights challenged these colonial dividing lines and 
exposed the contradictions between the existence of these rights on paper and the 
abandonment of the population in practice. 
 																																																								
24 For discussions of development as fantasy and myth, see Wolfgang Sachs, ‘Introduction’, in 
Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power; London and New York: 
Zed Books, 1992; pp.1-5; Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, 
trans. Patrick Camiller, 2nd edition (London: Zed, 2002), pp. 25-46. 
25 Associación Nacional de Usarios Campesinos Loosely translatable as National Association of Peasant 
Smallholders. 
26 Interviews and conversations with activists in Casanare and displaced members of ANUC, 2007-8. 
27 Articles, 48, 49, 53, 79, and 80 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution. 
28 See Julia Suarez-Krabbe, Race, Rights and Rebels: Alternatives to Human Rights and Development 
from the Global South (London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2015), pp. 1001. 
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Eventually, the peasant organisations secured commitments from the local authorities 
for public investment of oil revenues.  BP, meanwhile, agreed to undertake a series of 
works that included repair of environmental damage and the paving of roads eroded 
by the heavy traffic and shock waves from oil exploration.  Yet neither the local 
authorities nor BP complied with these undertakings. The result was that people 
began to take a more militant stance, organizing a series of civic strikes that blocked 
some of Casanare’s main routes.29  In January 1994, people in the hamlet of El 
Morro organized the first such strike.  This took the form of a two-week roadblock 
that prevented equipment from reaching BP’s installations. The commander of the 
16th Brigade declared the protest to have been organised by subversives. Several of 
those involved were subsequently killed, threatened or escaped attempts on their lives 
by paramilitaries. Others were imprisoned on charges of rebellion or had their houses 
raided by the authorities. Similar patterns of violence were repeated elsewhere.  
Numerous peasant leaders were killed, forcibly displaced and threatened. Eventually, 
even the strongest peasant organisation– the Casanare branch of ANUC - was 
destroyed.30 
 
BP was heavily implicated in the repression. According to the 16th Brigade’s 
commander of military intelligence, the company provided the army with 
photographs and film taken during meetings with activists. Several of those 
photographed were subsequently killed.31  BP had signed a £5.6million voluntary 
collaboration agreement with the Ministry of Defence for protection, as well as paying 
£60 million for its own special force.32  It was also revealed that BP had employed the 
private security contractor Defence Systems Limited to provide ‘lethal’ counter-
insurgency training to the police.33  Socialist guerrillas of the National Liberation 
Army (ELN) had, since the mid-1980s, been running a campaign against foreign 
appropriation of oil revenues. In neighbouring Arauca, the ELN had forced 
Occidental Petroleum to give an annual sum to the church for social projects.34  BP 
was having none of that. In line with the US-designed counterinsurgency strategy of 
the Colombian armed forces, the focus of these counter-insurgency efforts was on 
‘taking the water from the fish’: undermining social support for the insurgency by 
targeting potential sympathisers. 
 
In an interview with investigative journalist and author Gearóid Ó Loingsigh, the 
paramilitary commander Carlos Guzman Daza (alias Salomón) stated that ‘all the oil 
																																																								
29 Interviews with 3 former leaders of ACDAINSO, 16 April and 30 July 2007, and two displaced 
leaders of ANUC, 17 and 18 April 2008. 
30 Procuraduría General de la Nación et al, Informe de la Comisión Inter-Institucional, p. 17; Gillard, ‘BP’s 
links’, p. 16. Interviews and conversations with former leaders of the El Morro Community 
Association, 2007-8.  
31 Interviews and conversations with displaced former leaders of ANUC and relatives of victims, April 
2007-June 2008. The evidence of the commander of military intelligence was recorded in a Colombian 
inter-institutional report: Procuraduría General de la Nación, et al., Informe de la Comisión 
Interinstitucional, p.13.  See also Michael Gillard’s article breaking the story: ‘BP links with Colombian 
military intelligence revealed’, Scotland on Sunday, 9 June 1996, p. 2, 16. 
32 This was in addition to a compulsory security payment of US$1.25 per barrel. David Harrison and 
Melissa Jones, ‘Black gold fuels Colombia killing machine’, The Observer, 20 October 1996.  
33 Michael Gillard and Melissa Jones, ‘BP’s secret military advisers’, The Guardian 30 June 1997. 
34 Ejército de Liberación Nacional –National Liberation Army.  See Jenny Pearce, ‘Beyond the Perimeter 
Fence: Oil and Armed Conflict in Casanare, Colombia’, LSE Centre for Global Governance 
discussion paper (2004), p.6. 
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companies’ had given money to paramilitaries in Casanare. Salomón linked this 
directly to the suppression of resistance: 
 
when peasants organized strikes or protested about any situation that they 
considered to be affected by oil companies, the paramilitaries went in to 
threaten the peasants.  There is, or should be, a record of presidents of 
community associations who were killed or displaced because they opposed 
BP’s policies in Casanare, and this was done by the autodefensas [paramilitaries]. 
And as I say, the paramilitaries never did anything for free.  If they gave a 
service to someone, it is because this someone was financing or giving money 
or some bribe in exchange for threatening peasants, and people who opposed 
these policies’.35   
 
The arrival of the 16th Brigade in Casanare was a precursor to events that were to be 
repeated across the country.  By the second half of the 1990s, paramilitaries operating 
in collaboration with state forces were taking over vast portions of the countryside, 
clearing the way for an array of extractive projects through massacres and selective 
killings. Numerous transnational corporations have faced allegations of direct 
complicity in the repression.  Yet all this took place in the name of ‘development’ and 
the removal of obstacles to ‘progress’.  ‘We are the ones who sleep least at night in 
order to protect you’, a Sergeant of the 16th Brigade’s 44th Battalion told those 
gathered at a human rights meeting I attended in April 2008, as he justified killings at 
the hands of his battalion on the basis of rumours that some of the population were 
‘left wing’.36  
 
Neo-Colonial/Neo-Liberal States of Exception 
 
We should not rush to the conclusion that this emphasis upon improving and 
protecting the life of the population is only a smokescreen for the sacrifice of some to 
the prosperity and greed of others. Instead, we need to interrogate the mutually 
reinforcing intersections between the protection of life and exposure to death, and to 
locate these intersections within the history of colonialism. Otherwise, we risk 
repeating the tacit operating assumptions of ‘neutral’ humanitarian intervention, 
where armed violence is presented in terms of an absence (the absence of ethics, of 
the ‘rule of law’, or of a suitably strong state). Violence is perceived as the result of a 
sort of state of nature, where almost all humanistic intervention is to be welcomed for 
its potential to improve lives that would otherwise be – as Hobbes would have had it - 
‘nasty, brutish and short’.  The state cannot or will not protect or better the lives of 
the population (that argument goes), so ‘we’ – concerned members of the 
international community – must go in and do so, in the name of the cosmopolitan 
values of development and human rights. The focus is upon visible acts of violence, 
not the wider economic and legal backdrop, nor the moral discourses which sustain 
these acts.  Violence and humanistic intervention are presumed to work in opposite 
directions.  
 
Extreme violence is too often batted away, as something belonging outside of 
modernity, as the work of unintelligible Others that political and economic 																																																								
35 Translated Loingsigh’s transcript of the interview, 11 November 2007. 
36 Second Sergeant Ávila, comments to community human rights meeting, April 2008.   
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‘modernization’ is poised to overcome.  Yet, to read extreme violence in terms of an 
absence (of law or of ethics), is to occlude the active role of both law and moral 
discourse in enabling people to be deprived of their rights.  Contrary to popular myth, 
colonies were never ruled in ‘absolute lawlessness’. Nor does the capacity to dispose of 
human life reside at its core ‘in the exercise of a power outside of the law (ab legibus 
solutus)’.37  The Nasa indigenous people of Colombia speak of a colonial ‘death 
project’ that persists in the present and which is inseparable, not only from ‘racism, 
capitalism, patriarchy and predatory behaviours against nature’, but also from 
development discourse and from the legal capacity to render people politically non-
existent.38  
 
Giorgio Agamben famously highlighted the hypocrisy of knee-jerk bewilderment in 
the face of atrocity. ‘[I]t would be more honest and, above all, more useful’, he says, 
‘to investigate carefully the juridical procedures and deployments of power by which 
human beings could be completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no 
act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime’.39  The suspension of 
legal order does not occur within a legal vacuum or entail ‘weakness’ of the state.  
Rather, the ability to suspend the law in the name of ‘necessity’ is central to the 
operation of sovereign power.  Normal law is suspended by exceptional decree, yet 
the state of exception that results has a legal source because the decree is issued by a 
sovereign authority.  In the state of exception, people are cast out from the protection 
of law and divested of rights. They become ‘bare life’, mere animals, rather than 
subjects before the law. As such, they can be killed with impunity – without anyone 
being held to account for a crime. 40The state of exception is ‘illegal’, but nevertheless 
– as Agamben puts it - a ‘perfectly juridical and constitutional measure’.41  
 
 
Neo-Colonial States of Exception 
 
Agamben himself was hasty in claiming the concentration camp as both unique and 
archetypical of modernity. He overlooked the relationship between modernity and 
colonialism, as well as the role of capitalism in producing a class apartheid entwined 
from the start with colonial notions of race.42  Colonial rule, in what is now called 
Latin America and elsewhere, normalised the state of exception by drawing racialised 
dividing lines between ‘civilised’ minorities protected by law and ‘uncivilised’ 
majorities with no rights at all.43 The boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence remained in constant flux after independence. The racism instilled by the 
Conquest ‘left an inheritance of guilt and a fear the old gods would return’.44  In the 																																																								
37 Cf. Achille Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, in Public Culture 15:1 (2003), p. 24, 23. 
38 Suárez-Krabbe, Race, Rights and Rebels, p.3-4. 
39 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) 
p.171. 
40 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Giorgio Agamben, 
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 
41  Agamben, State of Exception, p. 28. 
42 See, for example, Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation 
(Brooklyn NY: Autonomedia, 2004); Suárez-Krabbe, Race, Rights and Rebels, Chapter 3. 
43 See e.g. Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.16. Ignacio T. Abello, Violencias y Culturas: Seguido de dos 
Estudios sobre Nietzsche y Foucault, a Propósito del Mismo Tema (Bogotá: Alfaomega y Ediciones Uniandes, 
2002), Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, pp.11-40. 
44 Jean Franco, Cruel Modernity (Durham and London: Duke University Press), p. 7. 
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decades following independence, ideological disputes among the oligarchy frequently 
erupted into civil war and the seizure of power by rival political-military leaders.45 
Each new leader would instate a new juridical order, supported by dense structures of 
patronage and a restricted suffrage in which those awarded the vote were, in practice, 
clients rather than citizens.46 Subsequent anxieties over modernization ‘transposed 
racism into a different key and turned the indigenous from an exploited labour force 
into a negative and undesirable mass’.47  The idea that society must be defended 
against an ‘enemy within’ has long underpinned a culture of exception in Colombia.48 
 
The formal use of exceptional measures became predominant during La Violencia - a 
twelve-year period of civil war that began in 1948.  Armed conflict between factions 
of the oligarchy subsequently subsided in the wake of a power-sharing deal. 
Meanwhile, however, the consolidation of insurgencies representing subaltern forces 
had reconfigured the terrain of struggle. So too had development entered the scene.  
In his inaugural speech of 20 January 1949, Harry Truman set out his vision of a ‘fair 
deal’ for ‘freedom-loving peoples’, an essential component of which was solving the 
problems of ‘underdeveloped areas’. Later that year, Colombia was the site of the first 
ever mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development aimed at 
formulating a general development programme for a country. This resulted in 
proposals for a ‘multitude of improvements and reforms’ through careful planning 
and administration of resources. The application of technocratic rationality across the 
economic sphere was deemed necessary for a ‘salvation’ that would make Colombia 
an ‘inspiring example’ for the underdeveloped world.49 Although leaders framed 
industrialization as a prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy, development in 
practice was inseparable from the growing international anti-Communist crusade that 
authorized extreme terror against dissidents and their potential supporters.50 
From the mid-1960’s, exceptional decrees were used repeatedly to repress protest by 
growing workers’ and student movements and to place restrictions on civil liberties 
and labour rights. In 1964, the communist guerrilla force of the FARC was formed 
amidst an already ‘genocidal’ anti-communism.51 The same year, the ELN was 
constituted under the influence of the Cuban revolution and the theology of 
liberation. In 1965, during a state of siege, Decree 3398 provided a legal basis for the 
formation of paramilitary groups on the grounds that the ‘defence of the nation’ was a 
task for everyone.52 By the time unsuccessful peace negotiations with the guerrillas 
began in the early 1980’s, a culture of juridical exception had become normalised. 
The provisions of once exceptional decrees had been incorporated into ordinary 
law.53 Decree 3398, for example, was absorbed into Law 48 of 1968.54 Systematic 
impunity had likewise become institutionalised as the result of a strategic failure to 
investigate abuses by state and para-state forces. This generated a state of de facto 																																																								
45 For a discussion, see Hylton, ‘Evil Hour’, pp. 53-5. 
46 Abello, Violencias y Culturas, pp. 21-23; Hylton, ‘Evil Hour’, pp. 53-8.   
47 Franco, Cruel Modernity, p. 8. 
48 García Villegas, ‘Constitutionalismo perverso’, p. 306. 
49 Escobar, Encountering Development, p.24. 
50 Franco, Cruel Modernity, p. 2. 
51 Hylton, ‘Evil Hour’, p. 57. 
52 Human Rights Watch Colombia’s Killer Networks.  
53 García Villegas, ‘Constitutionalismo perverso’, p. 323. 
54 Law 48 remained in force until 1989, when the Supreme Court declared the arming of civilians 
unconstitutional. 
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exception that facilitated the ‘dirty war’ in defence of society and nation.55 
Colombia’s ‘economic opening’ of the early 1990s cut into longstanding anxieties 
over modernity and its Others. The process that led to the 1991 Constitution was 
itself enabled by recourse to exceptional measures.56 Means were introduced to limit 
the duration of states of siege and the suspension of fundamental rights and liberties 
was prohibited.57 However, exceptional measures of the previous years were once 
again integrated into permanent legislation, while impunity was further entrenched in 
the justice system. 58 A ‘faceless system of justice’ was also established, allowing the 
accused to be tried whilst the identity of witnesses and judges remained secret.59 Law 
here is itself the vehicle of exceptional tactics: criminal law is a ‘tool of war’ that 
invokes not the figure of the delinquent but that of the enemy.60 Numerous features of 
states of exception were thus to be found, with their origins disguised, within the new 
legal order touted as the ‘social rule of law’. 
 
Illegal rule of law 
The violence of development does not refer merely to the coercive repression 
endemic to that project in many parts of the world.  The systemic violence that 
Escobar describes as ‘constitutive of development’61 is also directly enabled by 
ordinary rule of law. Although Colombia’s ‘economic opening’ involved further 
entrenchment of exceptional measures within a legal order supposedly based upon 
recognition of extensive political, economic, social and cultural rights, the tensions 
between formally-recognised rights and other juridical measures did not end here.  
Colombia is also a good example of how, across the world, neoliberalization has 
entailed reforms of domestic law which clash with the rights enshrined in national 
constitutions, enabling the plunder of labour power, services, territories and 
resources. The extensive rights provided for by the Constitution have been nullified in 
practice by laws enabling the privatization of services, the casualization of labour and 
plunder of natural resources under the influence and pressure of international 
financial institutions and transnational corporations. I have discussed this elsewhere 
by reference to the example of legislation regulating labour and granting concessions 																																																								
55 Javier Giraldo Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1996), pp.62-66, 
Boaventura de Sousa and Mauricio Villegas García ‘Colombia: El revés del contrato social de la 
modernidad’, in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Mauricio Garcia Villegas (eds.) El Caleidoscopio de las 
justicias en Colombia, Volume 1 (Bogotá: Siglo de Hombres Editores, 2001), pp. 73-4.   
56 De Sousa Santos and García Villegas, ‘Colombia: El reves del contrato social’, p.329. The 1991 
National Constitution was drawn up by a Constituent Assembly, in which opposition groups 
participated alongside traditional political parties.  This was part of a peace deal with guerrilla groups, 
although the process itself was a government initiative. 
57 The figure of the Estado de Sitio (State of Siege) was replaced with that of the State of Internal 
Commotion, which was limited, in the first instance, to a duration of 90 days. 
58 De Sousa Santos and García Villegas ‘Colombia: El revés del contrato social’, p. 349, 334-5; 
Giraldo, Colombia, pp. 61-2; Human Rights Watch, A Wrong Turn: The Record of the Colombian Attorney 
General’s Office (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).  This was partly a result of the new 
constitution having awarded the executive a large amount of influence over key appointments such as 
the Attorney General.   
59 Giraldo, Colombia, p. 61-2, 48, my translation. 
60 De Sousa Santos and García Villegas, ‘Colombia: El revés del contrato social’, p.79, my translation, 
García Villegas, ‘Constitutionalismo perverso’, p. 360. 
61 Escobar, ‘Development, Violence and the New Imperial Order’, p. 16. 
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to extractive companies.  Both sets of legislation served to confiscate the labour rights 
and territorial rights simultaneously enshrined in the Constitution.62 
 
From the perspective of formally recognised rights, these laws themselves are illegal. 
The legislation authorising and regulating neoliberal ‘development’ can also be 
thought of as occupying the threshold between law and exception. Indeed, we should 
not limit the concept of state of exception to questions of ‘security’ or ‘emergency’.  As 
David Whyte has suggested, the concept also ‘opens up a new way of thinking about 
the structure of legal power’ and ‘reveals how sovereign authority is constantly 
negotiating and reconstructing the boundaries of the law’.63 Neo-liberal states of 
exception are shaped both by active suspension of legal rights and the illegal rule of law 
shaped on a global level by international institutions and transnational corporations 
in their newfound role as legislators.64 
 
The normalisation of exception is combined with a situation in which the rights of 
corporations, of property and of contract effectively trump laws recognising the rights 
of human beings. Even in the Global North, neoliberalism has meant increased 
authoritarianism, with law increasingly redefined as a means of securing economic 
growth and incapable of limiting corporate actors.65 In the South, the legacies of 
colonialism and the armed repression of dissent have made this scenario particularly 
extreme. Those killed have, in general, been those deemed to represent obstacles to 
progress, to development, to the life of the population itself.66 
 
Imaginative geographies of exception 
The violence authorised through states of exception is asymmetric and spatialized. In 
Colombia, it follows the pattern of territorial dispossession etched across the country 
by extractivism. It is intensified in areas that have traditionally been strongholds of 
the insurgencies. The patterns of violence have not only been shaped through appeal 
to the technocratic ‘necessity’ of development and the every-present ‘threat’ of 
insurgency.  They have also been given form through a heavily racialised moral 
discourse. In national development discourse and – more recently – discourses of 
peacebuilding -  everything happens in the name of the life of the population. Rural 
areas with high levels of poverty and armed conflict are charted as uncivilised 
terrains, scarred by the pathology of rebellion and occupied by childlike populations 
who need to be developed and protected.67 
 
In his work on Orientalism, Edward Said powerfully exposed how colonial ‘imaginative 
geographies’ mark out a border in thought between ‘the West and the Rest’, the 																																																								
62 Coleman, ‘Global Social Fascism’, pp. 13-14. 
63 David Whyte, ‘The Neo-Liberal State of Exception in Occupied Iraq’, in William J. Chamblis, 
Raymond Mikalowski and Ronald C. Kramer (eds.), State Crime in the Global Age. Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2010, p. 135. 
64 Coleman, ‘Global Social Fascism’, pp. 16-20. 65	Coleman,	‘Global	Social	Fascism’;	Ian Bruff, Neoliberalism and authoritarianism’, in Simon 
Springer, Kean Birch & Julie MacLeavy (eds), Handbook of Neoliberalism. Routledge: New York, 
2016.  
66 See Lara Coleman ‘The Gendered Violence of Development: Imaginative Geographies of Exclusion 
in the Imposition of Neo-Liberal Capitalism’, in British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9:2 ( 
2007), pp. 204-219. 
67 Ibid. 
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civilized and the savage. 68  As I have explored at length elsewhere, colonial 
imaginative geographies are also reproduced and mediated within national spaces. 
Colombian national development discourse marks out a patchwork of ‘savage’ zones 
where the rights of citizenship are kept on hold. 69  The effect is to sanitize an internal 
colonialism, which implies the active suspension of normal rule of law. ‘Protection’ 
implies targeting these populations with brutal counter-insurgency techniques, while 
‘development’ involves the disavowal of citizenship rights of these same populations. 
It is in the context of this neo-colonial state of exception, in which the promotion of 
life and the authorisation of death are intertwined, that we must understand 
corporate responsibility for human rights. 
 
The Allocation of Humanity and Politics 
 
 
BP recognizes human rights 
 
The situation in Casanare became the subject of international attention in mid-1996, 
after a British journalist broke the story of BP’s links with the Colombian military.70 A 
loose grouping calling itself the Coalition Against BP began to organize public 
meetings and protest actions with the aim of keeping the issue in the public eye. BP 
appeared to flounder, denying the allegations and insisting that ‘subversives’ were 
waging a smear campaign against the company.71  Then, in early 1997, the Catholic 
Institute for International Relations entered the fray with a diplomatically worded 
letter in a national newspaper. Its author recalled that, ‘within an hour of the letter 
being published, BP were on the phone saying that they wanted to talk’.72 
 
The result was what became known as the Inter-Agency Group, a coalition of UK-
based NGOs comprising the Catholic Institute for International Relations, Save the 
Children Fund, Oxfam, Cafod and Christian Aid. Over the following two years, the 
group met several times with BP representatives, carried out short fact-finding visits to 
Casanare, commissioned independent research, and published two reports outlining 
their criticisms and recommendations to BP.73  BP, meanwhile, began to lead the way 
in propagating the idea that corporate responsibility for human rights was an integral 
part of company’s performance. In 2000, BP became one of the first signatories of the 
																																																								
68 Cf. Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 1995). 
69 Coleman, ‘The Gendered Violence of Development’, pp. 204-219. 
70 Michael Gillard, “BP links with Colombian military intelligence revealed”, Scotland on Sunday 9 June 
1996, p. 2. 
71 E.g. Phil Mead, quoted in David Harrison “Oilmen dread Columbian [sic] ‘kiss’” in The Observer 3 
November 1996; John Browne, quoted in Polly Ghazi and Ian Hargreaves, ‘BP’s Chief Executive is 
Making the Running on Green Strategy’, in New Statesman 126: 4341, 4 July 1997; Richard Newton 
“Business and Human Rights”, speech at Amnesty International event Birmingham 1 November 1997;  
Russell Seal (BP Managing Director) Letter in the Guardian 13 May 1997.   
72 Interview with former member of the IAG, November 2007. 
73 BP had attempted a similar dialogue with Colombian NGOs, the Colombian Oil-workers’ Union 
and ANUC around a possible code of conduct. However, this process was short-lived as most of the 
groups involved were wary of the likely effects of such an engagement (interview with former ANUC 
leader, April 2008; interview with representative of Colombian NGO CENSAT Agua Viva, 
September 2007). 
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Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for the extractive sector.74 The 
UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie, has praised 
BP’s human rights training facility for the Colombian army, stating that the 
Voluntary Principles had been ‘implemented most extensively at the country level in 
Colombia’.75 
 
Leaked email correspondence from BP’s Policy Director to a colleague in Colombia, 
prior to a visit from representatives of the Inter-Agency Group, makes clear what was 
at stake for BP in its engagement with NGOs: 
 
Andres, Well done.  I agree with your view that we would benefit by working 
more with Oxfam in Colombia.  They have been a great heklp [sic] to us 
here and are getting closer to us all the time.  Your visitors have a lot of 
influence in the development ngo community in the UK, and hence in how 
allegations against [us] are picked up or not.  Good and closer relationships 
with Oxfam will be a significant factor in differentiating BP globally. We 
must consider the possibility of partnerships at country or regional or even 
global level. Such a partnership would do a huge amount for BP’s reputation 
and be a competitive advantage which would be hard to erode. David76 
 
After his 2007 visit to Colombia, John Ruggie applauded the ‘positive impact’ of BP’s 
human rights training programme on the ‘once notorious 16th Brigade’. 77  
Meanwhile, back in Casanare, the 16th Brigade was continuing to ensure its ongoing 
notoriety. Soldiers killed community leader Angel Camacho, just by BP’s Cupiagua 
oilfield, the very month of Ruggie’s visit. A report by Colombian human rights 
organizations recorded at least thirty extrajudicial executions at the hands of the 16th 
Brigade over the course of that year alone.78 BP, however, was already a leading light 
among proponents of corporate ethics. Its community relations programme was now 
presented as a success story of ‘voluntary partnership with civil society organisations 
and government authorities in a joint effort to manage social issues and to contribute 
to sustainable development’.79  
 																																																								
74 Atle Christer Christiansen, “Beyond Petroleum: Can BP deliver?” (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansens 
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BP’s erstwhile ethical advisors apparently did not notice evidence that the company 
was implicated in ongoing abuses. The events in El Morro that had first drawn 
international attention were repeated at the end of 2002, when another roadblock 
was organized in protest at ongoing ecological damage, hyper-exploitative 
employment conditions for local people and BP’s continued failure to honour 
agreements with the community.  Over the following months, leaders received threats 
telling them to ‘stop fucking with BP’. In April 2004, Oswaldo Vargas, the treasurer 
of the community association that had coordinated the roadblock, was shot dead in 
front of his young son on his return from a meeting with BP. Five days later, Fasio 
Holguín, another leading member of the association, survived an assassination 
attempt. The following year, the president-elect of the El Morro Association of 
Community Action Groups was killed, alongside a friend, just a fortnight after he had 
survived an attempt on his life and asked the army for protection. Cartridges found at 
the scene of his murder revealed that the killers had used weapons inaccessible to the 
civilian population.80 The result was – once again - the flight of many community 
leaders from El Morro and the disbanding of the El Morro Community Association. 
Prior to the threats, a representative of BP’s community affairs department had 
declared that he was ‘tired’ of the El Morro Community Association because they did 
not ‘let the company work’.81  That problem had now disappeared.  
 
An obvious, but inadequate, response to this would be that corporate recognition of 
human rights is just a public relations exercise. In a fairly straightforward way, BP’s 
efforts to show its concern for human rights did serve to cover over abuses: they did 
affect whether allegations against the company were ‘picked up or not’. Nevertheless, 
corporate promotion of human rights does more than simply mask abuses beneath an 
ethical veneer. It works to shape understandings of ethics and of rights. Human rights 
cease to be tools of struggle and contestation. They are absorbed into parameters that 
reinforce the dividing lines between lives that count and lives that do not.  
 
 
Epistemic imperialism 
 
Peasant organizations in Casanare did not demand rights as the obedient, 
entrepreneurial citizens that national development discourse sought to incarnate.  
Demands for rights, as we have seen, were made in defence of a peasant class against 
the economic model. They highlighted the contradictions between the principle of a 
‘social rule of law’ enshrined in the Constitution and an approach to ‘development’ 
that precluded access to formally-recognised citizenship rights. When international 
NGOs took up the cause of the rights of people in Casanare, the content of the 
peasants’ demands was emptied out. Rights became abstract values, to be added on to 
the existing state of affairs, within a virtual reality of development policy-speak. 
 
At stake here was not simply co-optation. The Inter-Agency Group were far from 
unwilling to challenge BP and had intended to complement the more confrontational 
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campaigning.82 British academic Jenny Pearce visited Colombia alongside Inter-
Agency Group members, with the aim of gathering independent evidence and 
holding BP to account for the allegations against them. She described how BP was 
confronted with this evidence at a meeting with high-ranking company personnel:  
 
we not only told them that they could not claim ‘not to know’ what they army 
and paramilitary were doing, that we had evidence that the army was lifting 
roadblocks and letting paramilitaries through to target campesinos working on 
human rights, for instance, but also we had personally seen a member (a 
colonel I think) of the fifth brigade, a brigade accused of massive human rights 
violations, working in the offices of Defense Systems who provided BP with 
protection… As an outcome of that, Defense Systems lost the contract with BP 
and asked to see me on a later visit to Bogota and expressed their anger over 
what had happened for which they held me responsible.83  
 
The report that Pearce prepared for the Inter-Agency Group was likewise firm in its 
criticism, stating that ‘BP chose not to know’ what was going on ‘and listened instead 
to apparently “natural allies” such as the armed forces and political elites’. She argued 
that charges of complicity were justified given BPs reluctance to acknowledge the 
closeness of their own security personnel to the armed forces and that intelligence 
operations amongst civilians were likely to result in killing. BP, she said, needed to 
understand that the guerrillas were ‘only one part of the problem of violence’ in 
Colombia. Pearce underscored that this was ‘a problem that must be solved 
politically’ and that ‘the civilian population live in greater terror from the 
paramilitary right and the army’.84 Nevertheless, the picture painted by the Inter-
Agency Group in their public advice to BP was quite different. Former members of 
the Group said that, as charities relying on donor support, they had felt unable to 
publicise Pearce’s critique.85 
 
The Inter-Agency Group’s own report was permeated with the colonial distinction 
between reasonable, developed Self and the underdeveloped, irrational Other in need 
of experts to promote rights on their behalf. As much was assumed in its very title: 
‘Good Intentions are Not Enough’. From the start, the report discounted the 
possibility that BP was complicit in armed repression, or that peasant organizations 
were being subdued so that oil extraction could proceed uncontested. Colombia was 
emptied of history and politics, with oil reduced to a ‘strategic resource’ in an armed 
conflict. BP was positioned as a well-intentioned, if rather ineffective and misguided, 
‘corporate citizen’.86 The problem was, at root, Casanare’s own weak ‘civil society’, as 
the press summary of the report made clear:  
 
Despite BP Amoco’s efforts, the study shows that since it began working in 
Casanare, health, education and housing services to local poor communities 
have not significantly improved. Oil revenues have meanwhile boosted the 
region’s per capita GDP above the Colombian average. BP Amoco has 
seriously underestimated the weaknesses in Casanare’s civil society. Illegal 																																																								
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armed groups have multiplied and Casanare’s poor continue to suffer from 
escalating political violence and environmental problems. BP Amoco has a 
right to protect its staff and investment, but the potential exists for its own 
security arrangements to make matters worse. The IAG believes the company 
has underestimated the implications of its work in a region of conflict.87 
 
The NGOs’ recommendations included: that BP and sub-contractors ‘establish a 
code of conduct that addresses fundamental human rights laws and standards and is 
subject to independent and published audits’; that the company’s development 
initiatives ‘include a specific poverty-alleviation aim’; ‘[t]hat BPXC’s work to promote 
civil society is focused on transparent, systematic and ongoing consultations with all 
local stake holders’ and that BP improved their analysis of the relationship between 
violence and oil wealth. 
 
The Inter-Agency Group’s own analysis of the relations between violence and oil 
wealth was, however, sorely lacking. They took for granted an orthodoxy on conflict 
and development constructed around the agendas of governance institutions in the 
post-Cold War era, which has been ceaselessly repeated by NGOs seeking to 
maintain influence or secure funding, often in the absence of any evidence.88 This 
orthodoxy conjures up a series of ‘illegal armed actors’, with neither face nor history: 
groupings of economic-rational individuals motivated by either ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’ 
(or both) and directed in their actions by cost-benefit analyses.  ‘Natural resources’ are 
cast in this narrative as merely ‘strategic’ to their aims. Conflict is marked out as a 
particular sort of problem, amenable to solutions that favour the perpetuation of 
(neo)liberal approaches to development and ‘peacebuilding’. This is the case despite a 
cacophony of critique from across the social sciences.89 Such critiques are rarely 
debated. They are simply ignored within a professional technocracy where this 
orthodoxy is just ‘common sense’.  Here we enter the domain of simulation. The map 
precedes the territory.90 The terrain of conflict can be known in advance, prior to any 
interaction with the spaces in which those conflicts play out. 
 
The idea that natural resources are merely ‘strategic’ to financing armed conflict 
occludes the violence of the extractivist model. It also erases the politics of Colombia’s 
paramilitary groups as state-backed (and often corporate-backed) proponents of that 
model. Since the Inter-Agency Group wrote their report, it has become 
commonplace to accept that development (badly done) has often heightened conflict. 
Critique of hard-line neoliberalism has become routine in debates over peacebuilding 
and development. Yet even overt critics of neoliberal maxims of free trade and the 
application of economic reasoning to social activity continue to run on colonial 
ideological fuel: the task of ameliorating conflict is to be assumed through the 
supervisory benevolence of international institutions and NGOs. Conflicts might be 																																																								
87 Ibid., p. 1. 
88 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London, Zed Books, 2001), see especially Chapter 
5, ‘Global Governance and the Causes of Conflict’. 
89 The framework has critiqued on various grounds: for confusing means of financing conflict from the 
motivations for taking up arms; for ignoring the complexities and contingencies of context and failing 
to understand the psychology of motivation or the formation of political identities; for conjuring away 
the problem of capitalism (which is premised upon violent practice of primitive accumulation); and for 
ignoring the history of warfare in the making of modern states. See, inter alia, Christopher Cramer, Civil 
War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries (London: Hurst, 2006). 
90 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Michigan, University of 
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	 19	
influenced by global dynamics (illicit trade networks, neoliberal orthodoxy even), but 
their most significant aspects are ‘local’. The problem of conflict is framed against a 
backdrop of liberal ‘normality’. The civil peace is merely disrupted by illicit armed 
actors. Liberal capitalist democracy remains the end for which history was made.91 
 
The narrative is endowed with obviousness only through its discontinuity with 
contexts in which (real, live) ‘armed actors’ operate. It is not just that the politics of 
groups such as Colombia’s state-linked paramilitaries cannot be reduced to 
criminality or economic motivation. The armed struggles of insurgents likewise resist 
assimilation to notions of ‘grievance’ framed within the terms of liberal individualism.  
Mobilizations against injustice – whether armed or unarmed – are often pitched 
against the totality of social relations producing that injustice. Such struggles demand 
an unmasking of the concepts through which relations of oppression or exploitation are 
rendered natural, legitimate or amenable to ‘quick-fix’ solutions. Even critics of 
mainstream, top-down approaches to peace and development routinely fail to 
examine their own imposition of taken-for-granted conceptual frames. Guerrillas in 
Colombia are read in advance as, for example, those who simply ‘exploit the 
grievances of the oppressed’.92  Unburdened by history, out of time and context, they 
are but abstractions crafted from the categories of policy speak. 
 
‘Armed actors?  They might as well replace us with actors!’ one senior member of the 
ELN remarked when our conversation one morning in a high security prison touched 
on this mainstream tradition of conflict analysis. ‘Their theoretical frames do not 
capture our reality, or that of the population’.93 
 
The point is not to obscure the violences perpetrated within armed struggle, or to 
romanticize those struggles. It is to recognize the extent to which these abstract 
categories precede any interaction with the lives of actual human beings.  It is to 
underscore that ‘imperialism in representation reflects structural and institutionalized 
power relations’.94    
 
From here, rights can be added on – as abstract values to be pursued within a 
simulated reality. BP was urged to address the impact of its operations by adopting a 
(voluntary) code of conduct based on recognised human rights standards. With regard 
to Economic and Social Rights, BP was encouraged to promote ‘civil society’ in order 
to help ‘the poor’ overcome unsatisfied basic needs and the ‘dependence’ that 																																																								
91 An example can be found in a popular textbook chapter on ‘Poverty, profit and the political 
economy of violent conflict’: Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew Williams, Conflict and Development (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2009), Chapter 1.  The authors are putatively critical of conflict orthodoxy, 
noting for example the widespread tendency in literatures on political economy of conflict to confuse 
the ends and motivating factors of conflict with means of financing and surviving conflict.  They point 
out that development can ‘contribute to conflict’, for example by displacing large numbers of people’ 
and ‘may materially disadvantage some groups, encouraging them to view their status in relation to 
other groups’.  With regard to natural resources, they argue that management of natural resources – and 
perceptions of that management - is the key issue.  However even at the critical end of the dominant 
paradigm, the very framework for interpreting conflict occludes the violence of the accumulation 
process and assumes implicitly that and problems are located in the South and that solutions are to be 
found within Western expertise. 
92 Mac Ginty and Williams, Conflict and Development, p. 28.   
93 Interview, Palo Gordo Prison, 11 December 2007. 
94 Escobar, Encountering Development, p. 162. 
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rendered them vulnerable to the impacts of violence and environmental damage. 95 
Here too, we find one of those characteristic tropes of development policy-speak: an 
amorphous ‘poor’, whose neediness, ignorance and lack of agency generates a 
profusion of vulnerabilities, and who are in need of expert guidance to realize a better 
way of life.96 The NGOs offered their knowledge according to a long-established 
tradition of ‘educative trusteeship’ over colonized populations, which ‘aims to change 
behaviour and social organization according to a curriculum decided elsewhere’.97  
That curriculum set out a liberal vision of civil society, understood in terms of 
‘autonomy from the state, self-organization, the capacity to evaluate the performance 
of local and national political structures and the ability to generate space for free 
debate and non-violent conflict over a multiplicity of social, cultural and political 
issues’.98 By implication, the protests against BP were the work of organisations 
without the capacity for adequate evaluation and which did not represent a space of 
free debate or non-violence. 
 
The autonomy, analytical competence and capacity for ‘free debate’ of international 
NGOs is, by contrast, beyond question. This is the case despite their need to achieve 
donor support, despite the shaping of their expertise within a colonial regime of 
representation. A web of truth is woven in which experts are authorized to speak on 
behalf of ‘uncivil’ others and to inculcate norms of behaviour consistent with modern 
capitalist relations.  The language of professional expertise is powerful. Its parameters 
of legibility are ceaselessly reinforced by institutional practices.  Anything that falls 
outside is neither legible nor credible. 
 
‘What about the existing civil society around the oilfields’ I ask one former Inter-
Agency Group member in a Skype interview, attempting to speak her language. I 
almost hear her eyes rolling at the naivety of my question:  
 
‘Lara, there was no civil society around the oilfields’. 
 
I hesitate for a moment, without words. Do I tell her about members of that 
insufficiently civil society with far more sophisticated analyses of the relations between 
violence and development than that of the British NGOs? Or what that commander 
of the ELN would have said about the conceptual and methodological limitations of 
the doctrine that treats oil as a ‘strategic resource’?  Do I invest those accounts with 
authority as a result of my own institutionally-sanctioned expertise? I bite my tongue.  
I suspect neither of us will fare well when assessed against these norms of civility. 
 
In any case, the parameters of debate had already been tested and found to be robust 
in what they excluded.  It was not only aspects of Pearce’s report that were considered 
unpublishable. The Inter-Agency Group had also commissioned a study from a 
researcher employed by the Colombian Oilworkers’ Union, Pedro Galindo, which 
they refused to publicise in its entirety. Galindo had aimed to show, in his words, 
‘how the oil industry represented the imposition of a culturally and economically alien 
																																																								
95 Inter-Agency Group, ‘Good Intentions’, p. 7, 4-6, 2. 
96 See Escobar, Encountering Development, especially chapter 2. 
97 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, p.8. 
98 Inter-Agency Group, ‘Good Intentions’, pp. 3-4 
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model onto Casanare society and to put forward the idea that people in Casanare 
should be allowed to take responsibility for solutions to their own problems’. 99  
 
Galindo was savvy about the colonial politics of knowledge. ‘I was aware when the 
British NGOs approached me that I had a very different understanding of concepts 
that they took for granted, such as “civil society” and the distinction between 
“developed” and “underdeveloped” peoples’, he told me over coffee in Bogota. 
‘However, I had hoped that it would be possible to produce a report that could 
prompt debate between the two perspectives, which might then generate more 
respectful attention to the struggles of the peasant organizations’.100 
 
No such debate took place.  The Inter-Agency Group suppressed the report because 
it contained a discussion of how royalties were calculated so as to ensure what 
Galindo described as ‘maximum profits to the multinational and minimal benefits to 
the population’.101  This, the NGOs considered beyond their mandate, which was to 
address ‘civil and political rights and how income from royalties could generate 
sustainable development’.102  They did visit Colombia and attempt to ascertain the 
views of people there. However, the mandate to promote human betterment through 
general notions of development and human rights, within an otherwise unquestioned 
order, already established a frame within which certain things could not even be 
expressed. The struggles of people in Casanare were already illegible, and thus 
naturally erased from view.  Epistemic imperialism has powerful material effects. 
 
 
Civilizing society 
 
BP did go on to emphasise the promotion of civil society. In the mid-1990s, the oil 
companies in Casanare had already set up an NGO – the Fundación Amanecer (Dawn 
Foundation) - to ‘help position the oil industry as a generator of development’.103  We 
should not overstate the reach of such initiatives. Nor have they been particularly 
successful in improving people’s life-chances. Nevertheless, the Foundation’s work has 
made clear what is at stake in promoting ‘civil society’. Towards the end of 2007, 
while working on a research project with an NGO set up by displaced peasant 
farmers, I spent a day with the Foundation visiting some of their projects. Foundation 
representatives explained how their programmes were designed, ‘to develop peasants’ 
business capacities’, and create ‘an entrepreneurial culture’. They aimed to build 
‘social capital’ – for example through collective applications for micro-credit among 
groups of socios (stakeholders, or partners).104  As one employee put it, ‘we are trying 
to change the mentality in the Casanare countryside … from peasant to owner, 
producer, entrepreneur’.105 These stakeholder-partners are – like the armed actors in 
conflict orthodoxy - just a collection of economic-rational individuals who come 
together to pursue private goals. Where each individual is responsible for managing 
(inevitable) risks, the struggles of a peasant class fade into pursuit of the skills to 																																																								
99 Interview with Pedro Galindo, December 2007. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Interview with member of IAG, November 2007. 
103 Interview with senior representative of the Fundación Amanecer, October 2007. 
104 This term can also be used to refer to business partners, but normally connotes the English term 
“stakeholder” in NGO usage.  
105 Interview 23 October 2007, 
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mitigate those risks. BP meanwhile, is a ‘corporate citizen’ - a ‘founding stakeholder’, 
a ‘partner for development’ with the population.106 
 
Here too, colonial representations of Self and Other intersected with class divisions. 
Peasants, for Foundation employees, were childlike subjects, in need of guiding hands 
to become fully mature and rational.  ‘Here is where they hang their little hammocks’, 
the Foundation’s director commented as she showed me around an agricultural 
training camp as if it were a kindergarten. ‘This one is a bit of a naughty boy who 
doesn’t always do what we tell him,’ she said of one farmer with a nuanced critique of 
the advice that he should sell his produce to a supermarket chain. This ‘beneficiary’ 
gave an apt summary of the Foundation’s approach: ‘first BP destroyed the social 
fabric. Now they try to create a new one in their image’.107 Where peasants continued 
to mobilise around ongoing environmental damage and the killing of their 
neighbours, Foundation representatives turned up uninvited at meetings urging 
people to participate in their projects instead (something I witnessed on several 
occasions during a year of frequent visits to the region). 
 
The yet-to-be-civilized, infantilized population is also comprehended as the source of 
violence, because of their inadequate levels of civility.  In the words of BP’s Associate 
President, the company’s presence promised to help eliminate violence – ‘by 
improving the value of people so that they believed in the value of life’.108 Those who 
resist are not only dismissed as not understanding what is good for them. They can 
also be labelled subversives from whom the population must be protected. The 
promotion of civil society merges with militarized counterinsurgency. Death is 
authorized to protect and improve life. 
 
It was not only leaders of actual protests who were killed. Those identified as probable 
leaders of possible future resistance in areas targeted for oil-based ‘development’ were 
pre-emptively mopped up and made to ‘disappear’. In January 2003, a few months 
before oil exploration began in the municipalities of Recetor and Chámeza, 
paramilitaries took over the village of El Vegón and proceeded to summon and 
‘disappear’ more than sixty people. Their victims were those profiled as likely leaders 
of possible future protests: peasant leaders, university students, the local doctor, the 
schoolteacher. 109 It is no exaggeration to say that people have been killed so that they 
will demand no more than the corporate-NGO vision of civil society. 
 
 
Violent Others and bungling cosmopolitans 
 
Members of the Inter-Agency Group did acknowledge risks that the dialogue might 
be used to ‘rights-proof’ BP’s operations. ‘We felt we had to do something,’ one member 
explained.  ‘If even a few lives were saved it was worth it,’ said another. Perhaps, in 
the short term, some lives were saved by the termination of the contract with Defence 																																																								
106 See, for example, Fundación Amanecer, Informe Social 1994-2004 (Yopal: Fundación Amanecer); 
BP, “Developing business, improving income: the Yopal carwash grew with Fundación Amanecer 
support” (2011).  Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9028641&contentId=7052186 (Accessed, 4 
April 2011). 
107 Conversation October 2007.   
108 David Harrison, ‘Oilmen dread Colombian ‘kiss’”, in The Observer 3 November 1996, p.6. 
109 Interviews with victims’ family members and other local residents, Recetor, 30 July 2007. 
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Systems. What the British NGOs did not grasp was that the very form of its expertise 
already served to ‘rights-proof’ violent dispossession.  It did so by squeezing human 
rights to fit within the extractivist model.  
 
The only advice the NGOs were prepared to make public was permeated with the 
unspoken but assumed distinction between the botched cosmopolitanism of corporate 
executives and the state of nature in which deprived and potentially dangerous ‘local 
populations’ reside. The letter that prompted BP to initiate the dialogue assumed 
from the start that BP took its social responsibility ‘very seriously’.110 Inter-Agency 
group members emphasised that BP’s Policy Director (and author of the leaked email) 
was ‘very credible and liberal’, to the extent that he was even a member of Amnesty 
International.  ‘I met [BP CEO] John Browne in person and he was genuinely open 
to being challenged’, said one NGO representative, who observed that BP personnel 
seemed to find the allegations ‘bewildering and offensive’ and were willing to take on 
the NGOs views. ‘BP did move’. ‘They developed a sophisticated understanding of 
human rights’. 111 
 
Sir Geoffrey Chandler explained his approach to corporate executives on behalf of 
Amnesty International UK in similar terms: ‘the best of them have their own 
principles and morality, and … are no more or less moral than ourselves’.112 
Reflected in these comments is a sense of responsibility emergent from superiority. 
Human rights as the ‘burden of the fittest’, as Spivak might have it.113 Those Others, 
over there, could not reasonably have negotiated with success (or successfully 
negotiated with reasonableness?). ‘We’ have the benefit of expertise. The white men 
in suits are, at heart, ‘our boys’ – reasonable, decent, open to being challenged about 
their mistakes.  
 
It was within these colonial parameters for locating violence and defining capacities 
for action that BP could credibly deny the allegations. The Colombian inter-
institutional report that had sparked such a furore in the British press could be 
dismissed as ‘an ad-hoc local thing’ without even being read.114 BP was just the victim 
of ‘greed’ and resentment on the part of insurgents.115  Michael Gillard, the journalist 
who broke the story, recalled how he too was a target of this line of argument: 
 
for BP it was helpful to try and undermine my journalism by suggesting I was 
orchestrating the campaign’s activities and that, in turn, one of Colombia’s 
guerrilla groups was pulling my strings. I was first alerted to this smear 
campaign in 1997 after talking to an oil journalist in Houston who’d been 
briefed by Roddy Kennedy, [then BP CEO] John Browne’s Chief Press 																																																								
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Officer. I later heard through various sources that BP was smearing me as the 
ELN’s man in Europe116 
 
As Gillard put it, BP’s response was ‘a classic strategy of creating a division between 
so-called “reasonable” activists that they felt they could do business with and so-called 
“unreasonable” ones, who were subtly labelled as militants and guerrilla 
sympathisers’.  
 
The idea that the campaign was spawned from irrational or dangerous political 
agendas was a potential death sentence, not only in Colombia, but also for 
Colombians supporting the campaign in Britain. Asdrubal Jiménez, an exiled lawyer, 
was also named as a member of the guerrilla.117 His compatriots were afraid to 
associate with him for fear of reprisals and his family were thrown into panic that his 
refugee status would be revoked. 118  Freddy Pulecio, an exiled leader of the 
Colombian Oilworkers’ Union who had faced an attempt on his life in Colombia 
while he was working on the issue of BP, was named in the press as a subversive 
manipulating the campaign.119 An exiled representative of ANUC was still afraid of 
reprisals more than ten years after learning that she had been named as a guerrilla in 
a draft document that BP had planned to publish before the Inter-Agency Group had 
convinced them that it would be inappropriate to do so.120  
 
Opponents of corporations are not always labelled subversives in ways that feed so 
directly into armed repression. However, as Dinah Rajak emphasises, it has become 
standard to label them ‘unethical’. As more and more NGOs, lobby groups and even 
unions have been drawn into a burgeoning corporate-civil society network, 
campaigns against corporate abuses are routinely dismissed as uncivil, opportunistic, 
and as more interested in ‘throwing stones’ than ‘making progress’.121 Colonialism 
takes the form of a language of cosmopolitan common interest: human rights are not 
only good for humans but also good for corporations who are, by serendipity, 
perfectly-placed to transcend the irrationality and corruption of ‘local contexts’. This 
is the task of what Chandler described as ‘the community of interest between 
responsible governments, good companies and NGOs’.122  After all, at least the 
corporate-NGO nexus is ‘doing something’, whatever companies’ previous ‘mistakes’.  
As David Rice, BP’s Policy Director, put it, ‘we’ve learnt from our mistakes, not least 
because we’ve been challenged by NGOs’.123   
 
The notion of prior ‘mistakes’ is, Rajak notes, part of the performance of corporate 
‘citizenship’.  Confessions of past misconduct or errors of judgement pave the way for 
executives to set out new regimes of best practice developed in partnership with 
NGOs.124  BP was a leader here. Denials of intentional wrongdoing were quickly 																																																								
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117 Raynor, ‘Shadowy Trail that leads to London’; Semana ‘Estan “Pillaos”’. 
118 Transript of Manuel Vega’s interview with Asdrúbal Jiménez, 30 June 2007.  Jiménez had 
represented a different guerilla group, the Maoist Popular Liberation Army, in peace negotiations with 
the Colombian government. 
119 Semana, ‘Estan “Pillaos”’. 
120 Interview 28 February 2008. 
121 Rajak, In Good Company, p.40, 57-8. 
122 Chandler, ‘Business and Human Rights’, p. 5. 
123 David Rice, ‘Human Rights Strategies for Corporations’, Business Ethics: A European Review 11:2 
(2002), p. 135. 
124 Rajak, In Good Company, p. 35, 62. 
	 25	
tempered by the acknowledgement that BP had ‘made mistakes’ by entering 
Casanare without a full understanding of the context.125  To err is human, and these 
were mistakes from which BP had ‘learnt’.126  The actions of ‘local’ armed actors and 
blundering corporate executives might both result in death, but – in terms resonant 
with Himadeep Muppidi’s discussion of media representations of Saddam Hussein 
and George W. Bush - ‘only one of them functions in the arena of humanity and 
politics (of bungling, learning, living, accommodating, getting along) while the Other 
is in the realm of nature and necessarily outside of politics and history’.127  
 
 
The Architecture of Impunity 
 
The colonial imaginary investing corporate recognition of human rights is not merely 
symbolic (unfortunate but of little matter if lives are saved). It is a girder in the 
architecture of impunity. It reinforces the dividing lines between lives that count and 
those that can be killed without anyone being held to account.  Corporations do not 
merely recognize ‘human rights’. They allocate humanness differentially – to some and 
not to others – through the practice of recognizing rights. 
 
In the corporate code of conduct, the corporation gets to decide which rights are to 
be fostered (rather than guaranteed), and to what extent.128  Even where rights do fall 
within the company’s direct control, as in the case of labour rights, the voluntary 
nature of the code of conduct means that sovereign decision over which rights should 
be protected and how rests with the company. The problem, however, is not just that 
fewer rights are recognized. The subject recognised as a holder of rights, already 
reduced under liberal modernity to the figure of the citizen, collapses into that of the 
‘stakeholder’ in corporate operations.129 Promotion of the rights of ‘stakeholders’ 
entails, in its very formulation, the incontestable existence of those processes of capital 
accumulation (and consequent dispossession) within which the holders of privatized 
rights can have a ‘stake’.  Contestation of the economic model in the name of the 
rights of stakeholders is logically impossible.  It implies resisting a tautology. 
 
The point here is, I repeat, not to romanticize the rights of citizenship. It is simply to 
point out that the formulation of citizenship rights as the basis of state power has an 
inherent openness, elasticity and contestability. 130  It opens up the possibility of 
struggle over who is included and on what terms. This is where citizenship rights are 
entirely distinct from the private allocation of rights to ‘stakeholders’. The recognition 
of ‘stakeholders’ as the holders of rights opens no space for democratic contestation.  
The conceptual and legal matrix within which corporate recognition of rights takes 																																																								
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place forecloses any possibility of struggle over what those rights might mean.  The 
‘soft’ mechanisms of voluntary corporate responsibility exist within a framework of 
hard legislation that authorises plunder and dispossession and precludes anything 
other than a neoliberal economic model.  The wider neo-colonial/neo-liberal state of 
exception remains intact.  
 
The UN’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework responded to the potential for 
corporate responsibility to detract from violations by emphasising the importance of 
judicial remedy as part of a package of measures that should complement voluntary 
corporate responsibility.131  What this misses, however, is that the very configuration 
of voluntary corporate responsibility thrives upon the states of exception that provide 
a permissive environment for abuses. What is more, by representing the corporation 
as good moral citizen and benefactor, the conceptual basis of voluntary corporate 
responsibility renders the violence of development illegible and fuels the idea that 
those who oppose development are irrational or subversive. Allegations of crimes fade 
into acknowledgement of all-too-human ‘mistakes’, reinforcing the status of far-off 
Others as less-than-human. Corporate recognition of human rights, set against prior 
‘mistakes’, bolsters victims’ exclusion from human justice, as ‘bare life’ excluded from 
the political community: those who can – in Agamben’s terms – ‘be killed without the 
commission of a homicide’.132  By writing the economic model out of the domain of 
contestation, and by simultaneously affirming that model as open to being made 
ethical, recognition of the rights of corporate ‘stakeholders’ rationalizes a situation in 
which anything can be done to those who occupy the position of Otherness in relation 
to ‘development’ and ‘progress’. 
 
It is not just that those who protest are framed within this narrative as irrational and 
dangerous. The very framework renders the everyday violences of development 
illegible as forms of harm for which anyone can be held to account.  The erasure of a 
way of life, the destruction of land and the recasting of peasants as precarious worker-
entrepreneurs are now ‘benefits’ of development. Anything else is simply beyond the 
ambit of rationality.  When people contest those processes, they have no rights at all.  
Human rights codes of conduct are not a buffer against socio-economic dispossession 
or armed repression. They are a further instance of dispossession, representing the 
enclosure of rights supposedly offered as guarantees to all.  
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